Research

Interests

  • International security
  • Nuclear deterrence theory
  • Nuclear proliferation
  • North Korean nuclear strategy
  • Japanese politics and foreign policy
  • US-Japan alliance

Dissertation Topic

Beyond the Brink: Rethinking Assured Retaliation and the Nuclear Revolution

My dissertation examines states’ nuclear postures, and in particular, the disconnect between the theory of the nuclear revolution and policymakers’ beliefs about what forces are necessary for deterrence. Although the theory of the nuclear revolution argues that an assured second-strike capability is sufficient for deterrence, many nuclear powers have – or are pursuing – postures with more flexible options and robust command and control infrastructure to provide a wider range of employment options. To explain this discrepancy, my dissertation focuses on the challenges of deterring limited first use, and in particular, how the threat of “third strikes” can be used to alter the credibility of a state’s willingness to retaliate against limited use.

Publications

Kodama, Nick. “Threatening the Unthinkable: Strategic Stability and the Credibility of North Korea’s Nuclear Threats.” Journal of Global Security Studies 6, no. 1 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa004.

This article examines North Korean nuclear strategy, and in particular, North Korea’s threats to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. It presents a theoretical framework for understanding how the interaction between North Korea’s threshold for first use and US perceptions of that threshold affect stability between the two nuclear powers.

Click here for abstract

With the spread of nuclear weapons to regional actors facing adversaries with superior conventional and nuclear forces, the prospect of deliberate nuclear first use is no longer unthinkable. This is especially the case with North Korea, which not only faces strong incentives for first use in a crisis but also has made the threat of first use a key component of its nuclear posture. To analyze the emerging US-DPRK deterrence relationship, this article presents a framework for outlining North Korea’s calculus of when first use is rational, and examines the interaction between North Korea’s threshold for first use and the United States’ perception of that threshold. By conceptualizing this interaction with four ideal-typical dyads, this article argues that the most stable dyad is one in which the United States recognizes that North Korea has the capability and willingness to use nuclear weapons at low crisis thresholds.

Kodama, Nick. “Dynamic Institutionalization: The Foundations of Japan’s Radioactive Problem.” The Nonproliferation Review 26, no. 1–2 (January 2019): 43–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2019.1600261.

This article, based on my MA thesis, examines the domestic politics behind Japan’s development of a closed nuclear fuel cycle and the strategic implications of Japan’s nuclear latency. It ultimately argues that Japan’s continued pursuit of capabilities such as spent-fuel reprocessing is driven more by the local and domestic politics surrounding nuclear power, rather than by a deliberate “hedging” strategy.

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Many have suggested that the true purpose behind Japan’s development of a closed nuclear-fuel cycle is to maintain the technical potential to develop nuclear weapons. However, closer examination of the development of Japan’s nuclear industry shows that, although Japan possesses advanced nuclear technologies, there has been no deliberate strategy to create a nuclear-weapon option. There is no “nuclear hedge.” To illustrate this point, this article presents a framework called “dynamic institutionalization” to explain the origins of Japan’s nuclear policies and the different sets of institutionalized pressures and constraints that have perpetuated these policies over time. Japan’s continued development of closed fuel-cycle technologies is primarily driven by domestic politics and the lack of a permanent spent-fuel management solution. On the other hand, Japan’s institutionalized nuclear forbearance is driven by the calculation that, as long as US extended deterrence remains credible, Japan’s security is best guaranteed through reliance on the US nuclear umbrella. By analytically untangling the policy of closed fuel-cycle development from the rationale for nuclear forbearance, this article provides a more nuanced view of the relationships between the domestic and international variables shaping Japan’s nuclear policies.